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that greater justice would be accomplished by overturning the
rule reasserted in the principal case.

W. T.

PEGUES

JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD*
Since its creation, the National Labor Relations Board has
disposed of about a thousand cases. Of this vast number, the Supreme Court of the United States has passed on the Board's exercise of jurisdiction in seven.' About forty others have been reviewed by the various Circuit Courts of Appeals.
Although the decisions of the federal courts are of primary importance concerning the permissible area within which the Board
may exercise its jurisdiction, nevertheless we may not overlook2
the attitude of the Board itself toward the scope of its powers.
The expressed intention of the Administrator of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to be guided in the application of that act by rulings of the National Labor Relations Boards gives added emphasis
to jurisdictional findings by the Board.
All the cases which have been reviewed by the Supreme Court
have been approved insofar as the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Board is concerned. Of these, the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation case is first in importance. In approving the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act, the Court gave in broad
outline the guiding theory applicable to the test of federal power
to control:
"Although activities may be intrastate in character when
separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial
* Established by the National Labor Relations Act, § 3, 49 Stat. 449, 451
(1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 153 (Supp. 1938).
1. N.L.R.B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81
L.Ed. 893 (1937); Associated Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81
L.Ed. 953 (1937); N.L.R.B. v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58,
57 S.Ct. 645, 81 L.Ed. 921 (1937); N.L.R.B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S.
49, 57 S.Ct. 642, 81 L.Ed. 918 (1937); Washington, Virginia and Maryland
Coach Co. v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 142, 57 S.Ct. 648, 81 L.Ed. 965 (1937); Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 131 (1938); Santa Cruz
Fruit Packing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 303 U.S. 453, 58 S.Ct. 656, 82 L.Ed. 954 (1938).
2. See Despres and Myer, The National Labor Relations Board-Decisions
of its First Year (1936) 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 97.
3. 3 Labor Rel. Rep. 91 (1938).

1939]

COMMENTS

relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential
or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise
4
that control. . . . The question is one necessarily of degree."
The Supreme Court thus disposed of notions concerning the limitations of federal power over manufacturing and production
activities that were prevalent under its expressions in earlier
cases 5 and threw the whole problem of national control into the
uncertainty inherent in problems of "degree." Subsequent decisions 6 by the Court have followed this theory without throwing
much additional light on the proper manner of weighing the relationship encountered in any given case to determine whether it is
"close and substantial. ' 7
Nor have the decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals done
much to clarify this situation. These courts have approved the
exercise of jurisdiction in all but three cases presented.8 It seems
that the criterion which has served as a guide in all the decisions
is the degree of dependence of the particular business upon, and
its connection with, interstate commerce.9 Of the three decisions
4. N.L.R.B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37, 57 S.Ct. 615,
624, 81 L.Ed. 893, 911 (1937) (italics supplied). This rule was repeated in the
Court's most recent opinion in the following words: "And whether or not particular action in the conduct of intrastate enterprises does affect that [interstate] commerce in such a close and intimate fashion as to be subject to
federal control, Is left to be determined as individual cases arise." Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 59 S.Ct. 206, 214, 83 L.Ed. 131 (1938).
5. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U.S. 344, 42 S.Ct. 570, 66 L.Ed.
975, 27 A.L.R. 762 (1922); United Leather Workers' v. Herkert and Meisel
Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 44 S.Ct. 623, 68 L.Ed. 1104, 33 A.L.R. 566 (1924); Industrial Association v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 45 S.Ct. 403, 69 L.Ed. 849
(1925); Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 45 S.Ct. 551,
691 L.Ed. 963 (1925). See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct.
855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936).
6. See cases cited In note 1, supra.
7. N.L.R.B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 57 S.Ct. 642, 81 L.Ed. 918
(1937), where the jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B. was sustained because 99.57 per
cent of raw materials obtained outside state and 82.8 per cent of finished
products shipped out. In the case of N.L.R.B. v. Friedman-Harry Marks
Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 57 S.Ct. 645, 81 L.Ed. 921 (1937), there was constant
flow of raw materials and finished products across state lines to and from
respondent, but the Court's refusal in the Consolidated Edison case to consider the source of the company's operating materials may indicate that no
great support for jurisdiction would be found in such facts.
8. Foster Bros. Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 85 F. (2d) 984 (C.C.A. 4th, 1936);
N.L.R.B. v. Fainblott, 98 F. (2d) 615 (C.C.A 3rd, 1938); N.L.R.B. v. Idaho-Maryland Mines Corp., 98 F. (2d) 129 (C.C.A. 9th, 1938).
9. N.L.R.B. v. Hopwood Retinning Co., Inc., 98 F. (2d) 97 (C.C.A. 2nd,
1938) (23 per cent of its business in interstate commerce). Standard Lime and
Stone Co. v. N.L.R.B., 97 F. (2d) 531 (C.C.A. 4th, 1938) (83 per cent of product
sold outside of state). N.L.R.B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 94 F. (2d) 138 (C.C.A.
9th, 1937) (all operations within the state but 90 per cent of product shipped
outside).
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disagreeing with the Board's exercise of jurisdiction, one10 obviously cannot stand in the light of decisions by the Supreme Court
subsequently rendered, and the others" are at least of doubtful
validity.
In the exercise of its granted power to make regulations in all
labor disputes burdening and obstructing the free flow of interstate commerce, the Board has considered a great variety of cases.
The factors which it has deemed important12 in pursuing the
course charted by decisions of the Supreme Court will appear
from the following review of the Board's rulings.
Activities Directly in Interstate Commerce
Enterprises which are directly in interstate commerce have
readily been found subject to the Act. These have included: the
transportation of freight and passengers between countries;" the
activities of those acting as agents for others who admittedly do
interstate business;14 the affairs of enterprises engaged in communication across state and foreign boundaries 15 and in the widespread gathering and disseminating of information-0 or news
across state lines;"7 the operation of a truck line, although no state
lines are crossed,18 and even if operation is confined wholly within
a single city;' 9 an intrastate unit of transportation serving in an
interstate network, 20 or engaged in ferrying across a body of
2
water within the state. '

10. Foster Bros. Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 85 F. (2d) 984 (C.C.A. 4th, 1936).
11. N.L.R.B. v. Fainblott, 98 F. (2d) 615 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1938); N.L.R.B. v.
Idaho-Maryland Mines Corp., 98 F. (2d) 129 (C.C.A. 9th, 1938).
12. See Mueller, Businesses Subject to the National Labor Relations Act
(1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 1286.
13. In re France Lines, 3 N.L.R.B. 64 (1937); In re Cosmopolitan Shipping
Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 759 (1937).
14. In re Globe Service, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 610 (1937).
15. In re Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 500 (1936), jurisdiction affirmed, 87 F. (2d) 611 (C.C.A. 9th, 1937) (but petition of N.L.R.B. for
enforcement of its order denied on other grounds).
16. In re Consumers' Research, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 57 (1936).
17. In re The Associated Press, 1 N.L.R.B. 686 (1936), affirmed, 85 F. (2d)
56 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1936).
18. In re Central Truck Lines, Inc., 3 N.L.R.B. 317, 326 (1937): "The rerpondent Is engaged in the operation of a truck line which carries freight in
interstate commerce. All its employees, although they may not be actually
conducting the freight across state lines, perform some function necessary
to that interstate transportation. Any interruption in the performance of that
function would Interfere with interstate commerce."
19. In re Houston Cartage Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1937).
20. In re Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 767 (1937).
21. In re Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 85 (1935), 90 F. (2d)
520 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1937) (petition to enforce order of N.R.L.B. denied on other
than jurisdictional grounds). The respondent objected to the jurisdiction of
the Board contending that since the slips to and from which it proceeded
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Businesses Constituting an Integral Part of Interstate Commerce
Likewise, businesses producing or working upon the instrumentalities of interstate commerce have been held within the jurisdiction of the Board. Even though the particular concern is not
directly engaged in interstate commerce, if a cessation of its operations would directly interfere with the movement of commerce, then under the decisions of the Board it is subject to the
Act.
In the first case2 2 decided by the Board, it was held that a
labor dispute in an interstate bus-servicing garage would interfere
with interstate transportation, thus causing a burden upon commerce which the Act was designed to prevent.25 This view has
been reaffirmed in subsequent similar cases.2 4 The theory that the
business is an integral and necessary part of interstate commerce
has also been applied to concerns engaged in the following activities: furnishing tugboat assistance to ocean-going vessels;2 5 conducting interstate warehouse services;2 6 in the manufacture and
installation of motors for, and the use of an experimental field by,
commercial airships;27 the repair of fishing vessels which go outside the three mile limit;2 8 the supplying of longshoremen for the
29
purpose of unloading and reloading coal on interstate carriers;
the furnishing of watchmen and guards to various shipping companies for the purpose of guarding freight received from interstate
vessels; 0 the repairing of private automobiles;"1 and the operation
of stockyards facilitating the shipment of meats.2
Even though a company is not itself directly engaged in inwere entirely in Delaware waters, it was therefore not engaged in such commerce. In support of its view the respondent cited The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
557, 19 L.Ed. 999 (1871).
22. In re Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., I N.L.R.B. 1 (1935), order
of N.L.R.B. modified on other than jurisdictional grounds, 91 F. (2d) 178

(C.C.A. 3rd, 1937).
23. National Labor Relations Act, § 2 (8, 6), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935); 29
U.S.C.A. § 152 (Supp. 1935).

24. In re New England Transportation Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 130 (1936); In re
Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 769 (1936), order
enforced, 85 F. (2d) 990 (C.C.A. 4th, 1936), affirmed, 301 U.S. 142, 57 S.Ct. 648,
81 L.Ed. 965 (1937).
25. In re Gawanas Towing Co., Inc., Case R-634 (Aug. 5, 1938).
26. In re Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 454 (1936), order modified so as not to affect workers at plant not making interstate shipments,

91 F. (2d)
27. In
28. In
29. In
30. In
31. In
32. In

790 (C.C.A. 9th, 1937).
re United Aircraft Mfg. Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 236 (1936).
re Harbor Boat Bldg. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 349 (1936).
re Frederick R. Barrett, 3 N.L.R.B. 513 (1937).
re Williams Dimond and Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 859 (1937).
re Nolan Motor Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 357 (1936).
re St. Joseph Stock Yards Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 39 (1936).
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terstate commerce or working upon the instrumentalities thereof,
if other businesses or activities that are directly or indirectly engaged in interstate commerce, such as telegraph and railroad systems or the furnishing of navigation lights, are dependent upon
its service, the Board has jurisdiction. Thus the Board has held
that any labor dispute which may tend to disrupt this service
comes within its jurisdiction because of the possible burdening
effect upon the smooth flow of commerce. 3 Likewise, businesses
making use of power generated outside the state have been held
to be under the jurisdiction of the Board.3 4 The Board's exercise
of jurisdiction in such cases was approved in general by the Supreme Court in one of its most recent decisions."
Businesses Producing for Interstate Commerce
In keeping with decisions of the Supreme Court, manufacturing establishments which produce goods for shipment in interstate commerce come under the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board.36 Although the business may do most of
its purchasing and selling within the state, if it ships on interstate carriers,"7 or uses any route which goes outside the boundaries of the state, 8 it may be held subject to the Act. The cases
indicate that even though the initial movement of the goods is
not in interstate commerce, jurisdiction would exist if, for example, the purchaser is a mail-order house,"" a chain-store, 0 or jobber,'4 1 or if in the natural course of the purchaser's business the
product will enter interstate commerce. 2
As these cases indicate, the National Labor Relations Board
will take the subsequent disposal of the goods into consideration
in determining its jurisdiction over the original seller. But these
33. In re Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 835 (1937); In re Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 4 N.L.R.B. 71 (1937), jurisdiction
approved but order modified on other grounds, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 131
(1938).
34. In re Tupelo Garment Co., 7 N.L.R.B. No. 52 (1938).
35. Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 131 (1938).
36. In re Canton Enameling and Stamping Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 402 (1936); In
re Belmont Stamping and Enameling Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 378 (1936); In re Brown
Shoe Co., Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 803 (1936); In re Wheeling Steel Corp., 1 N.L.R.B.
699 (1936).
37. In re The Ontario Knife Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 29 (1937).
38. In re Shipowners' Association of Pacific Coast, 7 N.L.R.B. No. 120
(1938); see also In re D. and H. Motor Freight Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 231 (1936).
39. In re Hardwick Stove Co. Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 78 (1936).
40. In re Somerset Shoe Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 486 (1938).
41. In re Somerset Shoe Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 486 (1938); In re Empire Worsted
Mills, Inc., 6 N.L.R.B. 513 (1938).
42. In re Petroleum Iron Works Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 959 (1938).
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decisions do not indicate whether the time element with respect
to subsequent movements in interstate commerce would have any
effect on its jurisdictional finding. In one case, however, the
Board seems to have taken into consideration the universal use
of the product (carbon black) and thus inferred that its production would ultimately have an effect on interstate commerce. 48
In keeping with the foregoing, the decisions show the futility of
pleading that the title of the goods passed to the purchaser before they left the state " or that the respondent never at any time
held title to the goods, 4 5 although a recent decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals supports a contrary view.46
Businesses Dependent on Interstate Commerce for Supplies
Just as the use of the channels of interstate commerce in the
marketing or distribution of the products in which an establishment is dealing may result in federal power to control its labor
relations, so has the dependence of a business on interstate commerce for its sources been used as a basis for jurisdiction. Thus
the direct dependence upon interstate commerce for raw materials 47 or machinery and operating equipment

48

has been con-

sidered as conferring jurisdiction on the Board. And even if the
immediate source is local, the prior interstate movement of
materials may subject the business to the Act. 49 In holding
newspaper-publishing within the operation of the statute, the
Board has relied on the receipt of national advertising revenue, 50
the use of syndicated material51 and newsprint, ink and wrapping
material5 2 coming from outside the state, membership in the Asso43. In re United Carbon Co., Inc., 7 N.L.R.B. No. 78 (1938).
44. In re Botany Worsted Mills, 4 N.L.R.B. 292 (1937).
45. In re California Wool Scouring Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 782 (1938).
46. N.L.R.B. v. Fainblott, 98 F. (2d) 615 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1938); N.L.R.B. v.
Idaho-Maryland Mines Corp., 98 F. (2d) 129 (C.C.A. 9th, 1938).
47. In re Baer Co. Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 159 (1936); In re Pioneer Pearl Button
Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 837 (1936); In re Beaver Mills-Lois Mill, 1 N.L.R.B. 147 (1936);
In re United States Stamping Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 123 (1936); In re Radiant Mills
Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 274 (1936); In re Bendix Products Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 173 (1936);
In re Saxon Mills, 1 N.L.R.B. 153 (1936).
48. In re Standard Lime and Stone Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 106, 109 (1938); In re
The Novelty Steam Boiler Works, 7 N.L.R.B. No. 116 (1938). In both these
cases, machinery and equipment were purchased out of state.
49. In re Brown-Saltman Furniture Co., 7 N.L.R.B. No. 136 (1938): "A small
amount of these materials are procured by the Company directZy from sources
outside the State; the remainder through jobbers whose sources of supply are
located in other States and territories of the United States." (Italics supplied.)
50. In re Citizen-News Co., 8 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (1938).
51. In re The A. S. Abell Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 644 (1938), jurisdiction of Board
approved, but order modified on other grounds, 97 F. (2d) 951 (C.C.A. 4th,
1938).
52. In re Edward E. Cox, Printer, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B; 594 (1936);
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ciated Press,53 and the purchase of operating equipment or
replacement parts from out of state.5 '
Facts Considered of Evidential Value
The Board's practice of attaching evidential value to a variety
of facts in assuming jurisdiction is a further complication that increases the difficulty of discovering a standard by which the
power to control may be determined. In supporting its assumption of jurisdiction, the Board has pointed to such facts as the
registration of stock issues with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 55 the use of commission brokers 56 or stationary sales
representatives, '5 7 the employment of traveling salesmen,5 8 the
application for and use of trade marks, 9 the incidental interstate
movement of raw materials and finished goods,60 advertising in
national publications6 and by means of the radio,6 2 the securing
of a license to transact business as a foreign corporation,6 3 the application for and receipt of the meat inspection service of the Department of Agriculture,6 4 statements made in legal proceedings,6 5
or statements in a prospectus issued in connection with a sale of
bonds, 6 and finally, the extent of the market in which the busi67
ness competes with manufacturers in other parts of the nation.
The last-mentioned fact suggests that the existence of competition
between a local product and a product interstate in origin may
justify the exercise of jurisdiction. Although the presence of factors of this kind may not alone be controlling, their significance
cannot be overlooked.
53. In re The A. S. Abell Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 644 (1938), jurisdiction of Board
approved, but order modified on other grounds, 97 F. (2d) 951 (C.C.A. 4th,
1938).
54. In re Citizen-News Co., 8 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (1938).
55. In re Fedders Mfg. Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 818 (1937); In re Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 159 (1937).
56. In re Hubinger Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 428 (1937).
57. In re Rollway Bearing Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 651 (1936).
58. In re Atlas Mills, Inc., 3 N.L.R.B. 10 (1937).
59. In re International Nickel Co., Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 907 (1936); In re John
Blood and Co., Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 371 (1936).
60. In re Mann Edge Tool Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 977 (1936); In re Columbian
Enameling and Stamping Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 181 (1936).
61. In re National Casket Co., Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 963 (1936); In re Chrysler
Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 164 (1936).
62. In re Horton Mfg. Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 2 (1938).
63. In re Highway Trailer Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 591 (1937).
64. In re John Minder and Son, Inc., 6 N.L.R.B. 764 (1938). This service is
only supplied to firms engaged in interstate commerce (6 N.L.R.B. at 765).
65. In re Altorfer Brothers Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 713 (1938).
66. In re Whiterock Quarries, Inc., 5 N.L.R.B. 601 (1938).
67. In re Wallace Mfg. Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1937), affirmed, 95 F.
(2d) 818 (C.C.A. 4th, 1938).
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CONCLUSION

As shown by the foregoing survey there may be power to
control with respect to any process from initial production of the
raw product to its final delivery to the consumer as a finished article, if movement in interstate commerce intervenes. If, anywhere along the line, labor strife would tend to affect the flow of a
commodity through the interstate channels of trade and commerce, the power of the Board may be felt. But direct interference with a "flow" is not necessary. That is, the activity in question may affect interstate commerce although the "flow" has not
yet begun or has already ended. Original production of a commodity to be moved in interstate commerce is intimately connected with such movement, and likewise, the subsequent working upon or handling thereof will have a direct connection.
A troublesome problem arises from the possibility of a break
in the interstate movement which may result in the activities in
question affecting commerce only remotely or unsubstantially.
Although the production of goods for shipment in interstate commerce may confer jurisdiction, what if the things produced do not
move directly in such commerce? The Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed a Board order for lack of jurisdiction on a finding that the gold mined by the company was all sold
within the state and that no substantial out of state purchases of
material were made.6 8 This reversal occurred notwithstanding
the facts that the gold, after being commingled with other gold
secured elsewhere by the purchaser, was subsequently shipped
out of state, and also that about $125,000 of operating materials
used by the company were obtained from outside the state. The
existence of such a break, of course, makes original production
activities more "remote" or "distant" from the commerce that
they may affect. Although no mathematical formula may be prescribed to determine when a given effect may be properly called
"substantial," 69 greater exactness seems possible on the question
of "remoteness." Subsequent decisions can do much to point the
way.
Various problems are suggested by the cases such as whether
jurisdiction would exist if the labor trouble occurs in a seasonal
business at a time when no production is in progress,"° or when
68. In re Idaho-Maryland Mines Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. 784 (1938); reversed,
N.L.R.B. v. Idaho-Maryland Mines Corp., 98 F. (2d) 129 (C.C.A. 9th, 1938).
69. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 303 U.S. 453, 58 S.Ct. 656,
82 L.Ed. 954 (1938).
70. In re North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n, 6 N.L.R.B. No. 18 (1938).
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no shipments are being made or received,7 1 or if sufficient goods
to continue regular shipments despite the labor trouble are in
storage 7 2 or if the business can still continue to operate just as
efficiently without hindrance to the interstate movement of
goods.7

Obviously such questions lead back to the meaning of

"close and substantial" and to the problem of "degree." Until the
Supreme Court has spoken more definitely, no satisfying formula
for their solution can be devised.
In one case 74 a business was found subject to the Act although
the conduct of only one department thereof affected interstate
commerce. There was a finding however that the personnel of
the various departments was overlapping. Whether complete segregation would suffice to escape the operation of the Act has not
been decided by the Board. The solution to this question would
perhaps depend upon a factual showing that a labor dispute in a
department not engaged in interstate commerce would or would
not interfere with the functioning of the department affecting
such commerce.
In all the cases decided by the Supreme Court where the issue
of lack of jurisdiction was raised, the standard approach has been
to examine the actual extent of dependence upon interstate commerce of the particular business. However, it has been suggested
that the actual amount of the manufactured product which moves
in interstate commerce is unimportant so long as some portion of
it does. The position was that if even one per cent moved in interstate commerce the effect of labor troubles preventing or obstructing such movement would be direct and immediate, with
resulting jurisdiction in the Board.7 5 Perhaps the solution to this
problem lies in the meaning-of the word "degree" as employed by
the Supreme Court in the Jones and Laughlin case. 76 If the ref71. In re Rex Mfg. Co., 7 N.L.R.B. No. 16 (1938).
72. In re Louis Hornick and Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 983 (1937); In re The
Warfleld Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 58 (1938).
73. In re Kentucky Firebrick Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 455 (1937), affirmed, 99 F.
(2d) 89 (C.C.A. 6th, 1938); In re Sheba Ann Frocks, Inc., 5 N.L.R.B. 12 (1938).
74. In re Wald Transfer and Storage Co., Inc., 3 N.L.R.B. 712 (1937).
75. " . . . It is plain to see that interstate commerce is obstructed, because production of goods was halted by the unfair labor practice. I do not
believe that it is important whether 98 per cent of respondent's production
or only 1 per cent of it, actually moved in interstate commerce. So long as 1
per cent so moved, the unfair labor practice obstructed the movement to that
extent. The effect would therefore be direct and immediate." Haney, J., in
N.L.R.B. v. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co., 91 F. (2d) 790, 796 (C.C.A. 9th,
1937), noted in (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 302.
76. N.L.R.B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81
L.Ed. 893 (1937), cited supra note 4. See also the language of Haney, J., in
note 75, supra.
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erence here is to the directness or remoteness of the effect on
interstate commerce, then the view just stated is perhaps correct.
However, if this expression refers to the "extent" of the effect on
such commerce, such a view cannot stand. Considered in connection with the expression "close and substantial" which immediately precedes the use of the word "degree" in the Jones and
Laughlin opinion, the latter meaning is indicated. This position is
further supported by the statements in the Santa Cruz case that
"the provision cannot be applied by a mere reference to percentages" and "The question that must be faced under the Act upon
particular facts is whether the unfair labor practices involved
have such a close and substantial relation to the freedom of interstate commerce from injurious restraint that these practices may
constitutionally be made the subject of federal cognizance through
provisions looking to the peaceable adjustment of labor disputes."IT
In short, if one per cent of the output of a plant would have such
an effect then jurisdiction would exist, if not, there would be an
absence of power to control. The decisions of the Board seem to
follow this view.
SIDNEY W. JACOBSON

TACIT RECONDUCTION-A NEW LEASE
A lease is said to be tacitly reconducted' when, upon the expiration of its term and without opposition by the lessor, the
tenant remains in possession of the leased premises. The terms
and conditions of the original agreement remain operative by
reason of a legal presumption that this is the wish of the parties.
2
To demonstrate that in Louisiana law this tacit reconduction
operates to create a new though implied agreement between the
77. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 303 U.S. 453, 467, 58 S.Ct.
656, 661, 82 L.Ed. 954 (1938) (italics supplied).

1. Arts. 2688, 2689, La. Civil Code of 1870.
W'Cest la continuation de Za jouissance d'une ferme ou d'une maison au

prix et aux conditions que portait le bal qui est expird, et qu4 n'a point 6t6

renouveld." 13 Merlin, R~pertoire de Jurisprudence (4 ed. 1815) 379, vo. Tacite
Reconduction.
"It Is the continuation of the enjoyment of a farm or of a house at the
same price and conditions which attached to the lease which has expired,
and which has not been [expressly] renewed." (Translation by author.)
2. For the language of Articles 2688 and 2689, La. Civil Code of 1870, see
text, infra p. 444.

